Nope. A new paper explains:
As we approach the centennial anniversary of modern quantum mechanics this paper revisits the foundational debates through a new poll within the research community. ... our results indicate a persistent preference for the Copenhagen interpretation.It measures support for Everett/many-worlds at a measly 7%. This is even worse than the de Broglie–Bohm interpretation, which is not even a serious one.
Our findings, therefore, do not lend much support to Tegmark’s initial claim from 1997 that “the prevailing view on the interpretation of quantum mechanics appears to be gradually changing,” as the preferences in interpretations have remained rather stable since then.Tegmark promotes his own strange version of many-worlds.
Nature magazine has a similar story:
Nature asked researchers what they thought was the best interpretation of quantum phenomena and interactions — that is, their favourite of the various attempts scientists have made to relate the mathematics of the theory to the real world. The largest chunk of responses, 36%, favoured the Copenhagen interpretation — a practical and often-taught approach. But the survey also showed that several, more radical, viewpoints have a healthy following. ...So the physicists actually doing Physics accept the Copenhagen, and barely think of it as an interpretation. The philosophers are unhappy about this.The Copenhagen interpretation’s philosophical underpinnings have become so normalized as to seem like no interpretation at all, adds Robert Spekkens, who studies quantum foundations at the Perimeter Institute for Theoretical Physics in Waterloo, Canada. Many advocates are “just drinking the Kool-Aid of the Copenhagen philosophy without examining it”, he says.
Also, from PBS Space-time:
Is the multiverse bad science because 15:27 it’s unfalsifiable or an explanatory dead end. ...Nature quotes:So the badness of multiverse science depends very much on your definition of science. If 15:44 you adhere to a strict Popperian view that science is only that which can be falsified—disproved by 15:52 doable experiments—then you could argue that the multiverse is not science. But by the same logic 15:59 you would argue that hypothesizing that galaxies exist beyond the particle horizon is bad science 16:05 because that too can’t be tested.
A more relaxed view would say that science applies logical 16:11 reasoning coupled with a whole suite of tools to collectively find a consistent picture of what 16:16 reality is. If something is potentially a part of reality, then it’s in principle approachable 16:22 by scientific methods. So, if the multiverse might exist then it’s very much in the realm of science.
From their vantage point in one world, an observer measuring the particle would see only one outcome, but the wavefunction never really collapses. Instead it branches into many universes, one for each different outcome. “It requires a dramatic readjustment of our intuitions about the world, but to me that’s just what we should expect from a fundamental theory of reality,” says Sean Carroll, a physicist and philosopher at Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore, Maryland, who responded to the survey.No, it is not what anyone should expect.
CFT
ReplyDeleteRoger,
ReplyDeleteI wouldn't get too excited. Notice the wording in the paragraph you cite:
"...our results indicate a persistent PREFERENCE for the Copenhagen INTERPRETATION." emphasis added.
The words 'preference' and 'interpretation' are more about esoteric trivia popularity than truth. One thing I do like about Sabine is she isn't a PR cheerleader, she actually gives methodical explanations of why she agrees or doesn't with other physicists, often calling out their lemming like behavior which has more to do with chasing grant money, or what they memorized in college (or where they attended) than what they actually understand. Sean Carroll on the other hand is pretty much ONLY a cheerleader with a lot of pet political causes in his back pocket.
Groupthink doesn't make for very good science or research, and is very effective at smothering healthy skepticism.
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ReplyDeleteMost reasonable people reject MWI on the basis of the whole “wants to turn a theory about probabilities into a theory about nothing” problem I think. That and the metaphysical baggage of the worlds themselves (I don’t think I’ve ever read an account of where these worlds are supposed to go by the way. Are they hiding in my closet?)
ReplyDeleteHow do you think new derivations of probability in the many worlds context will affect the discourse though? Saunders wrote in a recent paper claiming that a frequentist version of branch counting can derive the born rule, and I imagine this will be a central argument moving forward:
https://arxiv.org/pdf/2404.12954
I think the main point of MWI is to make a philosophical objection to the concept of probability. So no, I don't think it makes any sense to try to derive the Born rule from MWI.
ReplyDeleteI'm firmly in the "structured synchronicity/measurement error" camp
ReplyDelete