The argument essentially says that nothing good can come out of quantum randomness. But if that were true, then nothing good could come out of quantum computers.
While I have argued that quantum computers are useless, I do not make that silly argument. Of cuorse quantum indeterminacy can be part of a useful process.
From a free will essay:
A second criticism of the indeterminacy argument is that it does not allow for the type of human choices that free will advocates need. The indeterminacy of electrons is a random thing, but genuinely free choices cannot be random: they are thoughtful and meaningful actions. If I am deciding between buying chocolate ice cream and vanilla and I randomly flip a coin to decide, that is an arbitrary action, not a free action. If in fact all of our actions were indeterminate in the way that electrons are, we would have nonstop spasms and convulsions, not meaningfully chosen actions. Rather than selecting either the chocolate ice cream or vanilla, I would start quivering like I am having a seizure. Thus, subatomic indeterminacy is no real help to the free will advocate. ...Yes, I think it is possible that a reductionist microscopic analysis of free will would show some quantum indeterminacy.
Second, regarding the contention that indeterminacy will only produce random actions, this is not necessarily the case. Quantum computers do not result in arbitrary events, like memory chips catching on fire, or printers printing out gibberish. Rather, quantum phenomena are carefully introduced into precise spots within the computer’s hardware, the result being that it can perform tasks with enormously greater efficiency than any other existing computer. So too with quantum biology: the results are biological processes that perform highly complex tasks with great efficiency, such as global detection, vision, and photosynthesis. If evolution has in fact tied brain activity to quantum phenomena, it is reasonable to assume that it would similarly facilitate an important biological process with great efficiency. None of this proves the existence of free will through indeterminacy, but it at least offers a scientifically-respectable theory for how nature might have implanted within our brains the ability to have done otherwise.
The essence of free will is the ability to make a decision that others cannot predict. So your decision will look random to them. So saying that there is randomness in fundamental physics is an argument for free will, not against it.
Here is philosopher Massimo Pigliucci making an argument that free will is incoherent:
The next popular argument for a truly free will invokes quantum mechanics (the last refuge of those who prefer to keep things as mysterious as possible). Quantum events, it is argued, may have some effects that “bubble up” to the semi-macroscopic level of chemical interactions and electrical pulses in the brain. Since quantum mechanics is the only realm within which it does appear to make sense to talk about truly uncaused events, voilà!, we have (quantistic) free will. But even assuming that quantum events do “bubble up” in that way (it is far from a certain thing), what we gain under that scenario is random will, which seems to be an oxymoron (after all, “willing” something means to wish or direct events in a particular — most certainly not random — way). So that’s out as well.Pigliucci is wrong on many levels. We invoke quantum mechanics because it is our best physical theory, and hence makes the world less mysterious, not more mysterious.
It now begins to look like our prospects for a coherent sense of free will are dim indeed.
Quantum mechanics is no more about "truly uncaused events" than any other theory. It makes predictions based on causality from past info and events. And an action from free wiil is not an uncaused event.
He says "random will" is an oxymoron, but a free choice does indeed appear random to someone who cannot predict that choice.
While this does not prove free will, it does refute certain arguments against free will.