I argue that the Oxford school Everett interpretation is internally incoherent, because we cannot claim that in an Everettian universe the kinds of reasoning we have used to arrive at our beliefs about quantum mechanics would lead us to form true beliefs. I show that in an Everettian context, the experimental evidence that we have available could not provide empirical confirmation for quantum mechanics, and moreover that we would not even be able to establish reference to the theoretical entities of quantum mechanics. I then consider a range of existing Everettian approaches to the probability problem and show that they do not succeed in overcoming this incoherence.I criticized the author, Emily Adlam, for a paper on relativity history.
Everett is the father of the Many Worlds Interpretation of quantum mechanics. I agree that it is incoherent. Some people prefer to call it the Everett interpretation so that it sounds less wacky. It is amazing how many seemingly-educated people take it seriously. It is like a stupid science fiction plot, and there isn't much substance to the theory at all.
There are not really any theoretical or empirical reasons for preferring MWI. The arguments for it are more philosophical. Its adherents say that it is more objective, or more deterministic, or more localized, or something like that. I don't know how postulating the spontaneous creation of zillions of unobservable parallel universes can do any of those things, but that is what they say.