Almost forgot to mention I made it 3rd prize in the 2018 FQXi essay contest “What is fundamental?”I don't know how she can get a Physics PhD and write stuff like that.
The new essay continues my thoughts about whether free will is or isn’t compatible with what we know about the laws of nature. For many years I was convinced that the only way to make free will compatible with physics is to adopt a meaningless definition of free will. The current status is that I cannot exclude it’s compatible.
The conflict between physics and free will is that to our best current knowdge everything in the universe is made of a few dozen particles (take or give some more for dark matter) and we know the laws that determine those particles’ behavior. They all work the same way: If you know the state of the universe at one time, you can use the laws to calculate the state of the universe at all other times. This implies that what you do tomorrow is already encoded in the state of the universe today. There is, hence, nothing free about your behavior.
The universe is not really made of particles. The Heisenberg Uncertainty Principles shows that there are no particles. There are no laws that determine trajectories of particles. We have theories for how quantum fields evolve, and even predict bubble chamber tracks like the ones on the side of this blog. But it is just not true that the state tomorrow is encoded in the state today.
Look at radioactive decay. We have theories that might predict half-life or properties of emissions and other such things, but we cannot say when the decay occurs. For all we know, the atom has a mind of its own and decays when it feels like decaying.
The known laws of physics are simply not deterministic in the way that she describes.
She goes on to argue that world might still be indeterministic because of some unknown failure to reductionism.
In a way, chaos theory is such a failure of reductionism, because deterministic laws give rise in indeterministic physics. But she denies that sort of failure.
What she fails to grasp is that quantum mechanics is already compatible with (libertarian) free will.
The advocates of many-worlds (MWI) are nuts, but at least they concede that quantum mechanics does not determine your future (in this world). It makes for a range of future possibilites, and your choices will affect which of those possibilities you will get.
Of course the MWI advocates believe that every time you make a choice, you create an evil twin who gets the world with the opposite choice. That belief has no scientific substance to it. But the first part, saying that quantum mechanics allows free choices, is correct.
The other FQXI contest winners also have dubious physics, and perhaps I will comment on other essays.