He prefers something called QBism, but nearly everything he says could be considered a defense of the Copenhagen interpretation.
Much of the ambiguity and confusion at the foundations of quantum mechanics stems from an almost universal refusal to recognize that individual personal experience is at the foundation of the story each of us tells about the world. Orthodox ("Copenhagen") thinking about quantum foundations overlooks this central role of private personal experience, seeking to replace it by impersonal features of a common "classical" external world.He is drawing a fairly trivial distinction between his QBism view and Copenhagen. He illustrates with this famous (but possibly paraphrased) Bohr quote::
When asked whether the algorithm of quantum mechanics could be considered as somehow mirroring an underlying quantum world, Bohr would answer "There is no quantum world. There is only an abstract quantum physical description. It is wrong to think that the task of physics is to find out how nature is. Physics concerns what we can say about nature."Mermin's only quibble with this is that he prefers "each of us can say" to "we can say". That is, he doesn't like the way Bohr lumps together everyone's observations and calls it the classical world.
Okay, I guess that distinction makes a difference when discussing Wigner's Friend, a thought experiment where one observer watches another. But for the most part, Mermin likes the Copenhagen interpretation, and successfully rebuts those who say that the interpretation is deficient somehow.